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by clocker bob_Archive
THE NEOCONS ANTAGONIZE CHINA
The great neocon project of the late 1990s was that of a US confrontation with China.
Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations crisis cookbook had identified two challengers to
Anglo-American world domination: the Moslems, because of their population growth,
and China, because of its economic growth. Neocon thinking oscillates between these
two as the more immediate threat. After the Taiwan straits confrontation of 1996, the
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in May 1999, the Wen Ho Lee case, the
Cox report on alleged Chinese espionage, and the Chinagate accusations of Beijing
funding for Clinton, US-Chinese relations were at a low ebb. As former US Ambassador
to Beijing James Lilley pointed out, “:…there has been a dramatic change that is
pervasive and, at times, ugly. After the Belgrade bombing accident in May of 1999, we
saw the full face of anger, hostility, and even hate on the faces of the Chinese attacking
our embassy.” Lilley went on in a threatening tone: “If China continues to expand its
military parameters, it will encounter our power. China can avoid this confrontation by
buying into economic globalization, and lowering nationalistic tensions. To do otherwise
is to risk tearing down the whole structure.” (Newsweek, April 16, 2001)
The good will expressed towards the US by the Chinese students in Tien An Men Square
in 1989 had completely dissipated, and was replaced by loathing – well before 9/11 and
Iraq. Something similar had happened in Russia and elsewhere – also before 9/11.
Bush’s first months in office were dominated by an incident involving the mid-air
collision between a US EP-3E Aries II spy plane and a Chinese F-8 fighter jet just off the
coast of China near the main base of the Chinese South Sea Fleet in Zhangjiang.. Here
US planes on electronic surveillance missions had long been regularly buzzed and
harassed by Chinese interceptors. During one such encounter the Chinese fighter collided
with the larger and slower US plane; the Chinese jet crashed and the pilot was lost, while
the US plane had to make an emergency landing at a Chinese airport on Hainan Island.
The plane and its crew of 19 were detained for a couple of weeks before being returned to
the US. The Chinese demanded a formal apology, which the pugnacious Bush
administration was reluctant to make. The Chinese press ran pictures of the downed US
spy plane with headlines reading “Proof of Bullying,” and contemptuous attacks on
“Little Bush.” Chinese internet chatrooms buzzed with talk of imminent war; “Are you
ready? This is war,” said one posting. The neocon Weekly Standard headlined its story
about the Hainan incident “A National Humiliation,” and authors William Kristol and
Robert Kagan, both prominent chickenhawk warmongers, accused the newly installed
Bush 43 of “weakness” in handling the affair. The neocons were disturbed by Colin
Powell’s reliance on diplomacy to get back the plane and crew for the US, and especially
by the attitude of the US business community, which was more interested in profitable
deals than in seconding the neocons’ distorted view of national honor. (Newsweek April
16, 2001)
The whole experience was an object lesson to the neocon clique and the
military provocateurs. For eight years they had writhed in bitterness because of Clinton’s
sane reluctance to resort to military force. Now, after the tremendous effort required to
put Bush into the White House, the result was not much more satisfactory. We can safely
assume that neocons and provocateurs drew the obvious lessons: that they must begin
thinking along more grandiose lines, and planning for an outside event several orders of
magnitude greater than any attempted thus far.
Tensions increased elsewhere as well. During the 1990s, Moscow and Beijing were
repeatedly and pointedly reminded of the presence of an aggressive faction inside the US
government and military which was intent on provoking periodic incidents to exacerbate
tensions among the major powers. From Kosovo to Belgrade, from the Barents Sea to the
South China Sea, from Iraq to Somalia, this aggressive faction had provoked clashes,
manufactured pretexts for intervention, and fought a proxy war near the heart of Europe.
The 1990s were anything but idyllic; they were a period of escalating economic and
strategic crisis. The sympathetic interest in US life seen in 1989-1991 in Russia and
China had by mid-2001 been replaced by overwhelming hostility. At the same time, the
aggressive and adventurous network inside the US government was deeply dissatisfied
with their own failure to achieve decisive results. Every passing year brought population
increases throughout the Moslem world, and 10-15% economic growth rates to China,
while the US real economy (apart from Wall Street’s paper swindles) continued to
stagnate. Like the British contemplating German economic growth in 1905-1907, the US
war faction concluded that a long period of world peace could only result in the further
relative decline of the US. To create the political preconditions for what they wanted to
do, the US war party therefore began to feel an overwhelming need to become the party
of synthetic terror.
The groundwork for the aggressive and terror-based consensus at the end of the 1990s
had been laid starting in March 1992, when Paul D. Wolfowitz, then the Pentagon's
Under Secretary for Policy submitted his long-term Defense Planning Guidance to then
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. As the press wrote at that time, the Pentagon policy
paper asserted “that America's political and military mission in the post-cold-war era will
be to insure that no rival superpower is allowed to emerge in Western Europe, Asia or the
territory of the former Soviet Union.” The role of the UN would dwindle to
insignificance, the paper indicated, and US unilateral action would dominate the world.
Wolfowitz’s plan also stressed “using military force, if necessary, to prevent the
proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in such countries
as North Korea, Iraq, some of the successor republics to the Soviet Union and in Europe.”
Direct nuclear blackmail of Russia was also prominent; the Wolfowitz document
underlined that American strategic nuclear weapons would continue to target vital aspects
of the former Soviet military establishment. The rationale for this targeting policy was
that the United States “must continue to hold at risk those assets and capabilities that
current – and future – Russian leaders or other nuclear adversaries value most” because
Russia would remain “the only power in the world with the capability of destroying the
United States.” The essence of US policy was seen in intimidation, “convincing potential
competitions that they need not aspire to a greater role,” thus guaranteeing that no rival
superpower would be allowed to emerge. (The New York Times, March 8, 1992)
Richard Perle later elaborated an aggressive strategy for Israeli politician Beniamin
Netanyahu known as the “Clean Break” policy, which was based on rejecting a
negotiated peace with Arabs and Palestinians in favor of endless war. Brzezinski’s 1997
Grand Chessboard touted the benefits of US meddling central Asia for geopolitical
reasons; this study was similar in spirit to the Karl Haushofer’s 1934 Weltpolitik von
heute, the manual of Nazi geopolitics. But how to manipulate the American people into
accepting the burdens and human losses associated with such meddling? Brzezinski, a
petty Polish aristocrat, replied: “The attitude of the American public toward the external
projection of American power has been much more ambivalent. The public supported
America’s engagement in World War II largely because of the shock effect of the
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.” (Brzezinski 24-25)
An even more explicit call for US world domination came from the Project for a New
American Century, a neocon movement that provided most of the top officials for the
Bush 43 administration. After discussing their imperialist plans, the PNAC authors, led
by chickenhawk William Kristol, focused on the way of duping the American people into
supporting the raft of new foreign adventures: “…the process of transformation is likely
to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event – like a new Pearl
Harbor.” (PNAC, September 2000)
It is in this restless mood, desirous of a new global
conflict to pre-empt the emergence of challengers to a new Anglo-American world order,
viewing the democratic system as unresponsive to their elitist warmongering, and eager
for the assistance that a spectacular external attack would bring, that the roots of 9/11 are
to be sought.