242
by kokorodoko
Second reading of Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.
The idea here is that an action is to be judged as morally good insofar as it is performed in accordance with a certain maxim. Such a maxim can (the writer hopes to show) be worked out by the use of reason. The objective is to establish something which holds as a principle of a moral action regardless of its empirical content - its practical consequences or the personal inclinations of the one performing the action.
It is only an action performed on the basis of a rationally deduced maxim that can be called a free action, since "free" means "not determined by incidental external events", and actions performed out of a personal inclination or out of consideration for practical consequences clearly are so determined, and thus not free. Free actions are free because the one performing them have excised themselves from the sphere of nature, meaning they have made their will be determined by reason rather than happenstance, giving them a kind of control over it that they do not have over natural phenomena, given that pure reason functions apart from experience, likewise giving that will a permanence and predictability that it would not have were it left to the influence of circumstance. Put differently, they have decided to conform their behaviour to law.
The action has no object except itself. Its object is not even the action per se, but the determination to act in a certain manner. This is what consitutes duty - the plain commitment to principle.
One thing sticks out to me:
An individual's personal attitude to a moral command, which is considered irrelevant, is sorted away as "inclinations", making no attempt to delve into the nature of these inclinations and what origins they might have and what they might say about the different people who actually live in the community. An inclination is an inclination, some might have inclinations that make them content and fulfilled to do their duty, some might have such that it makes them miserable - nothing to do about it.
This might be fine if it concerned strictly the "practical" law - that which the lawmakers and the governors do - but Kant makes no essential distinction between that kind of law and personal, individual morality. The latter is the "subjective principle of volition" and the former the "objective principle", and Kant is explicit that ideally there is no difference between the two. The final aim is to align one's individual conduct fully with what the social order commands, and it would be so, says Kant, if reason had complete control over our desire.
As in Aristotle (which puts the whole field of ethics into perspective), a morally good and right action has a end, which is social. Kant terms them allgemein-zweckmässig - concerning the common and directed toward some purpose. So quit loitering, citizen, and make yourself useful!
"God is in heaven and the tsar is far away", was a saying in old Russia. Kant moves God into your head, along with the cop and the commissar.
My own categorical imperative therefore: Everyone who espouses this philosophy shall be tortured in purgatory by Nietzsche.
And if that sounds too extreme, I just started on Arendt's The Human Condition, which seems much more to my liking.
born to give