386
by kokorodoko
Fichte: Foundations of Natural Right (1797).
Starts with defining a rational being, "the I", equivalent to a subject, which is defined as an activity, and identical to this activity. The activity which a rational being is, is self-reflection. The subject comes into being by positing itself, by declaring itself to be. In the very act of declaring itself to be, it declares itself to be something over here, confronting another thing over there, which is taken to be distinct from it (that over there is called the object, the thing, or the world - 'object' in German is Gegenstand; that which stands opposed to).
It is the very act of declaring itself that creates the division between subject and object, therefore the world as it appears to a subject is only insofar as it has been posited - indirectly, through the subject's own self-positing. The world is only insofar as it is an object of consciousness for a subject, and a subject is conscious first by declaring itself to be (thereby being conscious of itself), and in and through this very activity having emerge the thing to which it is opposite.
This sure is a puzzling way of talking about being (we've seen it before in Berkeley's "being is being-perceived"). What I could guess it means is this: When we say that the world which we encounter is, we talk precisely about this thing that appears to us. Any thing whatsoever that is said to be, is in this way, as something we encounter - I encounter this world, this thing, that means it is; I might encounter some other thing in this manner, that means that thing is. There is no actual way in which the word 'is' or 'being' works, which is not referring to things encountering us in this way - as objects of our consciousness. Fichte writes that "being is a determinate modification of consciousness".
A disctinction is made between things having being and having reality. While no thing "is" independent of our consciousness, things are certainly "real". They are proven to be real by the fact that they resist our comprehension of them. Fichte puts it in a lovely way: "the I is constrained in its presentation of what emerges". While the subject can choose to engage or not engage in trying to comprehend the thing, it cannot choose what is to be comprehended, or how this is to go about - there are certain conditions that must be met and certain steps that necessarily follow one another once one engages in such an attempt.
The subject in itself is completely free, since it is a being of pure thought. It came into being by thinking itself into being, but also there was no thinking before it was, because it *is* thinking. Thus it is fully unconditioned. But though it is free in itself, if it wishes to comprehend the object, it must limit itself in such a way that this becomes possible. Though imposing limitations on itself, this is done voluntarily on the part of the subject, and the comprehending activity is therefore still considered to be self-determined.
We can probably surmise how this is to proceed wrt the individual living among other individuals in a political community.
The activity of the subject, when this activity is engaged in comprehending the object, is called the "concept". This also seems an odd usage, but we can probably think of it like this: A concept is a thought of or about an object, and thinking of an object means being engaged in the activity of comprehending it - if, that is, the thinking is truly about the object, and not only seemingly so (as we might sometimes use 'concept' to mean simply an idea, which may or may not refer to something real). The correspondence between concept and object is guaranteed by defining the concept as specifically the thinking activity which is engaged in comprehending the object, thereby at the same time the thought which emerges through this activity (or rather, is this activity).
A kind of thinking which is properly philosophical (and also "scientific"), is one which grasps thinking as this self-positing activity - a self-positing through which a world/object/thing necessarily emerges as distinct from the subject, AND grasps these distinct parts as a single act of comprehension, which IS the activity that is the subject. This formulation is carried on unaltered into Hegel. Marx is then to spend some time on the coinciding of object and concept, and the idea of consciousness-as-activity.
Off to a thrilling start, and we're barely past the preface!
born to give