Read a little bit on Durkheim and it's very interesting. He's trying to define the qualitative difference in the transition to a modern form of society. He views societies as determined by a kind of moral structure which forms the basis for how members relate to themselves and the collective, how they are expected to act and what they expect from others and so on. The character of this moral structure (and thus the nature of the society in question) can be defined by (1) the degree to which each member sees their own values as identical to that of the community, (2) how emotionally invested they are in the keeping of these values (and thus the offense which a violation of these values causes them), and (3) how clearly defined the values are - less clearly defined values leave more up to individual interpretation.

Modern societies are characterized by a loosening of all these factors. As we can see especially from the last one, less clearly defined values not only allows you to decide for yourself the proper action in any situation, but requires of you to do this. Societal development can therefore be defined as a continuously increasing degree of individuation (which Durkheim links to divisions of labour). Whereas pre-modern societies are centered around religion ("everything social is religious" in such a society), modern society sees a notable retreat of religion as a factor of social life (and therefore also as a determinant of collective mores).

This does not however result in a dissolution of norms, as some claim, but in the emergence of a new kind of collective moral structure - one that sees the advancement and realization of the individual as its main reason for being.

Where we will probably find reason to disagree is in Durkheim's proposed strategy for dealing with this transition, which is essentially to erect strong institutions and civil-societal bodies that can direct and orient the individual in this new environment - invent a new tradition, in a sense. He appears to be troubled by the in-between, "anomical" state of individuals unmoored from any firm collective structure. At the same time he seems to hold to a kind of Hegelian utopianism. He observes that in simpler societies, an individual tends to view themselves as coextensive with their own group, and as fundamentally removed from individuals of other groups. As individuation progresses, individuals come to identify less and less with whatever group they emerge from, and find it easier to relate to individuals of very diverse backgrounds. Eventually, we will be at a stage when individuation has progressed so far that no individual will find anything in common with any particular group, and the only commonality they will find with another individual will be simply the fact of being an individual. All particular communities being rendered meaningless, we are left with a single human community.

Where I think he's right on the money though is in pointing out the counter-intutive nature of the state in relation to individual freedom. Modernity is characterized also by a steady growth of the state, which rather than being a threat to individual freedom can serve as a condition for it. Sweden is one obvious example, whose model has been termed "state individualism". Much as I love 60s radicalism, the extreme aversion to "bureaucracy" and all the insistence on direct-this and unmediated-that have something superstitious about them.

enframed wrote: Fri Jul 07, 2023 10:12 am I feel you. Everyone says and everything I read (or am told to read, then I check it out and put it down, and "every" is not an exaggeration), point to past trauma and operating within so-called "trauma bonds." That everyone has them. Maybe some people just don't, and have some of these issues anyway. I find it not helpful.

I think it's just a lexicon in a lot of ways, but the use of the word feels exclusionary for my lifelong difficulties. I know it doesn't invalidate my experience or feelings, but it does make a lot of the writing on the subject a lot less useful for me. And some of it is VERY useful without that lexicon.

kokorodoko wrote: Sun Jul 02, 2023 9:22 am Fichte: Foundations of Natural Right (1797).

In the course of a discussion on the sphere within which an individual can act freely, within which they can freely arrange and modify all that belongs to that sphere, without interference from the will of another, we come upon this interesting passage:


Now for this to be the case, it is necessary that everything remain as it was once known by the free being and posited in his concept (regardless of whether it is now specifically modified by him or not). What has not been modified but only thought by the rational being and brought into conceptual alignment with his world becomes modified, precisely by not having been modified.

It is in consequence of his concept of the end of the whole (to which this particular thing is supposed to conform), that the person has not modified the thing, since it [already] conforms to his concept simply by virtue of its natural shape (and he would have modified it if it did not thus conform); or he has modified his end in accordance with the thing's natural characteristics. His refraining from a particular activity was itself an activity, a purposive activity, and thus a modification, even if not of this particular thing, but rather a modification of the whole to which this thing was supposed to conform.


When I decide some purpose which I want to strive toward, this entails envisioning a future state in which my world is organized in a certain fashion - one that conforms to the chosen purpose. All of the different elements of my world will be modified as I proceed toward this future state, as they need to be in order for my purpose to be realized. But they are each considered modified even when they are not moved from their place, or altered in their shape. It is the very fact of belonging to the "concept" of my chosen purpose - being located within a world envisioned (consciously planned) to be in a certain state - that determines their essence.

If an element cannot be modified as required by the purpose, then the purpose has to be modified. Which would be the same thing as modifying the self - choosing to direct oneself toward some other purpose.

So the nature of each thing is determinable only in the context (the "totality", I guess) of an end chosen by a conscious (rational) being.

Clearly Marx gets some of his stuff from here. Here also mind melds with nature - natural history becomes human history, as all things of nature come to fall within the scope of human purpose-oriented activity.

Relating to this, I'm also reading Kant's Toward Perpetual Peace, in which "Perpetual Peace" is the future state which is taken to necessarily follow from adherence to the moral law. It is the end-state for the realization of which all other elements will modify and arrange themselves.

Reading The Deluge, and it's an odd duck. It's compelling, but often eye-rolling in execution. Might be the first novel I've encountered that reads as a pitch for its own adaptation, which is inevitable.

kokorodoko wrote: Sun Jul 02, 2023 9:22 am Fichte: Foundations of Natural Right (1797).

Right, so this is getting interesting.

The founding of a commonwealth is described here in a familiar manner - individuals cannot trust each other to be left alone, since they each in their independent, singular being (i.e. "by nature") have the capacity to enforce their will to the full extent of their power, and the only thing ultimately preventing this, aside from natural obstacles, is a stronger counter-will. Each individual being able to cognize this, they come to an agreement to each and in common renounce this power and place it in a third party which will rule over them, in accordance with a law also agreed upon, a law the validity of which they can each independently cognize, a law which they thus each voluntarily place upon themselves.

This transfer of power is in the text called an "alienation" of power. Attention of course peaks here, but at first it does not seem to be the obvious. This word is in the German text Veräusserung (detatching and placing outside oneself) while the Marxian one is Entfremdung (making or becoming strange/alien to oneself).

Continuing to investigate, I find out that there is a legal term called "alienation", a term which means transfer of property, and for which Veräusserung is the German word.

The use of violence or coercion is obviously a kind of property, one which is transferred to the state in order to safeguard the rest of one's property. Property is here defined as the sphere within which you are permitted to act freely, to freely impose your will on, or realize your will in, the world.

And exactly that kind of power is labour power. So the figure fits well enough. The question is then if both these kinds of alienation might be mentioned in Marx, and how this compares to Hegel and Feuerbach, through whom the concept arrives at Marx.

One thing somewhat troublesome in this is that, although Fichte is unusually specific about the body as that which is being protected (the use of one's creative ability is considered the extension of one's body), the only role the body has is as a means for enacting one's will. It is for that purpose that the body should be protected, and why one wants one's body to be protected, but not the body for its own sake.

The idea of the human individual as identical to and reducible to its activity (which continues in Marx) can also go some unpleasant places.

On the other hand, we can easily translate the idea of activity to that of production, in which case production is ceaseless, all around, and mostly obscured. Certainly not something which appears to be exhausted by the idea of conscious, rationally planned production (since that kind of view of action, as we have seen in Kant, involves clearing away everything not lawbound (and always requires a kind of force or coercion on a material, to make it conform to the law)).

A_Man_Who_Tries wrote: Thu Jul 20, 2023 8:07 pm Reading The Deluge, and it's an odd duck. It's compelling, but often eye-rolling in execution. Might be the first novel I've encountered that reads as a pitch for its own adaptation, which is inevitable.

I haven't read that one yet, but I wasn't a big fan of Ohio.

Denim and Leather - the Rise and Fall of the New Wave of British Heavy Metal by Michael Hann.

Finally restarted and finished Moby Dick while on vacation. Like so many dense novels it's really not that daunting if you can put in an hour or more a day. Reading it for 15 minutes before bed after a long work day was not the correct way to take that one in. Some truly hilarious and also some gruesome moments. Totally satisfying and inevitable ending.

Started Dance Dance Dance by Murakami. Must be my sixth or seventh of his. His books are like comfort food to me, which is maybe a little weird. They're just so easy to read and always a little uncanny and sad.

Richard Hell’s autobiography I Was A Very Clean Tramp. Really beautiful. So good, I recommend 100%

Nose Dive: A Field Guide to the World's Smells, by Harold McGee.
The Pursuit of Italy, by David Gilmour (not that one).

llllllllllllllllllll wrote: Thu Jul 27, 2023 7:42 pm Richard Hell’s autobiography I Was A Very Clean Tramp. Really beautiful. So good, I recommend 100%

Just finished it -

I feel like I understand Tom Verlaine (and Bob Quine) and rock and roll much better now. Hell is such a wonderful writer. I really loved this one